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Lawson, Letitia

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# Globalisation and the African State

LETITIA LAWSON

*The World Bank and its critics are approaching consensus on central issues in the African development debate. That Africa must become more integrated into the globalising world economy, and that to do so effectively it will need more capable and socially responsive states is now broadly accepted. However, the manner in which African states are already embedded in their societies and in the global political economy has not been integrated into the analysis. The nature of these linkages tells us much about how African states engage the forces of globalisation, and the effect that engagement is likely to have on economic development and on these states themselves.*

The IMF, World Bank and others remain convinced that 'globalisation will continue to be a vehicle for closing the gap between the industrial countries and the rest of the world'.<sup>1</sup> The IMF defines globalisation as 'the growing economic integration of goods, services, and capital markets'.<sup>2</sup> As such, it is not a new phenomenon, but rather an old one that has accelerated rapidly in recent years. In some parts of the globe the process has been guided primarily by 'the invisible hand' of global markets, in others the iron fist of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes has been brought to bear. Not surprisingly, scholars of the iron fist regions tend to be more circumspect about the benefits of globalisation. Mengisteab, for example, agrees that 'integration with the global economy is essential for Africa's development', but he goes on to note that 'African economies are the most dependent on the global economy for their growth and they are the most marginalized in the global system. Ironically, the policies that have been implemented to promote integration with the global economy have reinforced marginalization'.<sup>3</sup> After nearly two decades of structural adjustment, sub-Saharan Africa's position in the global economy continues to wane.<sup>4</sup> While its trade dependence has been surpassed by Asia in the

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Letitia Lawson, Naval Postgraduate School, California

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1990s (with trade to GDP ratios of 60.3 per cent and 65.8 per cent, respectively, in 1999), it nevertheless remains more trade-dependent than developing countries as a whole (56.1 per cent), and far more trade-dependent than developed countries (46.1 per cent).<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, Africa's share of exports in world trade has declined from an already miniscule 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 1.4 per cent in 1990 and 1.3 per cent in 1998.<sup>6</sup> Gross domestic product for sub-Saharan Africa grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 per cent from 1965 to 1980, 2.1 per cent in the 1980s and 2.4 per cent in the 1990s.<sup>7</sup> When population growth is factored in, per capita GDP growth was positive only in the first (pre-liberalisation) period. As a result, sub-Saharan Africa entered the twenty-first century poorer than it was at independence 40 years earlier, globalisation notwithstanding.

If Africa's economic performance raises questions about the virtues of globalisation in closing the gap between the Third World and the First, it does not provide very clear answers to those questions. One certainly cannot draw the contrary conclusion, that development in the North necessarily begets underdevelopment in the South, as early dependency theorists claimed.<sup>8</sup> While Africa has stagnated and declined, other 'peripheral' regions have grown and developed. East Asia grew at an average annual rate well above seven per cent throughout the 1965–99 period, even with the financial crisis of the mid-1990s.<sup>9</sup> After absorbing the effects of its own debt crisis in the 1980s (at least temporarily), Latin America returned to healthy, if less exceptional, growth in the 1990s. Its average annual growth rates for the three periods under consideration were 6.1 per cent (1965–80), 1.6 per cent (1980–89) and 3.4 per cent (1990–99). Even South Asia, a region with initial levels of development more comparable to sub-Saharan Africa, has experienced sustained economic expansion, especially in the 1980s and 1990s (growth rates of 3.7 per cent for 1965–80, 5.1 per cent for 1980–89, and 5.7 per cent for 1990–99). Moreover, export sectors have been an important part of both the economic success of non-African Third World countries and the economic failure of Africa since 1980. While average annual growth in export volume for sub-Saharan Africa was 0.9 per cent between 1980 and 1995 (that is, significantly negative in per capita terms), East Asian exports grew by 9.3 per cent for the 1980–90 period, and by 17.8 per cent in 1990–95, South Asian exports grew by 6.6 per cent and 8.6 per cent, and Latin American exports grew by 5.2 per cent and 6.6 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

The international financial institutions have long maintained that the benefits of globalisation to Africa are limited by domestic obstacles: bad policies,<sup>11</sup> poor governance<sup>12</sup> and weak states,<sup>13</sup> with most recent analyses folding policies and governance into the broader concept of state capacity.<sup>14</sup> Although virtually all scholars agree that these domestic factors have affected Africa's economic performance adversely, there is less agreement

as to the nature of the relationship between globalisation and weak states. The World Bank believes that African states lack capable market-facilitating institutions (rule of law, macroeconomic policy making, efficient provision of public goods) needed to *absorb* the inherent benefits of globalisation.<sup>15</sup> Others, including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and many African analysts, maintain that African states lack the institutional architecture of 'developmental states' needed to *manage* the positive and negative aspects of globalisation.<sup>16</sup> Ihonvbere suggests that the Nigerian state lacks the institutional coherence needed to *engage* the forces of globalisation at all. He laments that for 'a country that cannot construct viable and fairly predictable political platforms and [state-society] relations in the 21st century, it is doubtful that the forces of globalisation, positive and negative, will take it seriously'.<sup>17</sup> The respective implications of these analyses are that without rapid progress on state building, the forces of globalisation will continue to skim over, run over or simply overlook sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, whether the ultimate goal is the creation of a capitalist state, a developmental state or a democratic state (and these are not mutually exclusive, of course), there is broad consensus that African economic growth and development in the era of globalisation are hamstrung by weak states.

This consensus on the need for more capable states has recently extended to a new emphasis on social embeddedness. In a 1999 work subtitled 'African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment', Mkandawire and Soludo criticise what they see as the overly technocratic approach of the Bank to state building, and point to the importance of 'socially anchored' states in East Asian economic success. They conclude that 'a major challenge in transforming the African state into a development one is to go beyond merely enhancing its technobureaucratic capacity and seek to embed such a developmental state within democratic social institutions and governance frameworks'.<sup>18</sup> By 2002 the Bank had reached precisely the same conclusions. Having determined that its emphasis had been disproportionately on the 'supply-side' (programmes designed to reform the structure of the state and strengthen public sector management), it announced it would move into 'demand-side' approaches, aimed at 'engaging civil society more broadly in the quest for public sector reform'.<sup>19</sup> This expanding consensus advances the analysis by 'bringing society back in' to the development debate. However, it also threatens to obscure a fundamental analytical flaw: both the Bank and 'the African perspective' fail to appreciate the extent to which society has already engaged the state, through mechanisms that are both highly rational for peasant societies, and highly deleterious to any development agenda.

It seems self-evident that the social structure of a particular society will strongly affect, if not determine, how, specifically, the state will be socially embedded. Insofar as capitalist, developmental and/or democratic states do not drop from the sky, but must make and remake themselves out of existing state institutions, the historicity of the African state similarly will affect the kind of state that is likely to emerge in the future. The literature on developmental states in East Asia and South America, and particularly the cross-regional comparative work of Peter Evans and Stephan Haggard, clearly demonstrates this for those countries.<sup>20</sup> In all cases, economic development was based upon the same 'triple alliance' of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state, local capital and transnational capital. The superior performance of East Asian countries is attributed to specific characteristics of this alliance: more capable technocratic state structures (a result of specific colonial histories), the disconnection of the state from the interests of agrarian landlord classes (a result of revolutionary and interstate conflicts of the 1940s and early 1950s), and the consolidation of developmental states (following from the two previous factors) in advance of the systematic involvement of transnational capital. As a result, developmental states in East Asia were both stronger and more autonomous than their South American counterparts. South American bureaucratic authoritarian states sought to play similar developmental roles, but strategies and outcomes were affected by lower levels of bureaucratisation, and higher degrees of constraint by both quasi-feudal agrarian elites and transnational corporations, whose interests, which acted as a drag on economic transformation, could not be ignored.<sup>21</sup>

In short, global economic structures mattered, but state capabilities and domestic class structures mattered more. What does this mean for embedded autonomy in Africa? In his more recent work, Evans touches briefly on the case of Zaire, setting its 'predatory state' up as the polar opposite of 'developmental states'.<sup>22</sup> In a particularly vivid metaphor, he suggests that developmental states are midwives, while predatory states are cannibals. Developmental states organise society, predatory states disorganise it. While there is surely some truth in this, Evans' analysis of Zaire rings hollow, perhaps reflecting his superficial engagement with it. His analysis is ultimately too state-centric, too inattentive to the very social-structural issues that drove his earlier comparative analysis of East Asia and South America. Let us begin, therefore, with his earlier theoretical contributions to the debate about the newly industrialising countries (NICs), and extend these to African social structures. To do this we need to answer three questions. What is the nature of the African state? What is the nature of African social structures? How is the state embedded in these social structures? The answers to these questions will tell us much about how

African states engage the forces of globalisation, and what effect that engagement is likely to have on economic development and on these states themselves.

#### THE AFRICAN STATE

Over the past 35 years, scholars have probed the issue of statehood in Africa from various perspectives, but all relying upon a Weberian definition of statehood, that is, 'legal order, bureaucracy, compulsory jurisdiction over a territory and monopolization of the legitimate use of force'.<sup>23</sup> A consistently recurring theme is that the African state is most notable for absences. In 1968, Zolberg asserted that 'the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features'.<sup>24</sup> In the early 1980s, Callaghy reasserted that the major issue in contemporary Africa continued to be 'the absence of central state authority and the resulting search for it'.<sup>25</sup> At about the same time, Jackson and Rosberg went searching for an explanation of 'why Africa's weak states persist' at all, finding that African states are much more juridical than empirical entities, and concluding that 'global international society ... has been generally successful in supporting the new state jurisdictions of independent Africa; thus, the survival of Africa's existing states is largely an international achievement'.<sup>26</sup> More recently, Herbst has suggested that 'how, finally, to ensure that there are viable states across Africa is one of the great political and humanitarian challenges that the world faces in the twenty-first century'.<sup>27</sup>

This widely discussed institutional weakness of Africa states, like the institutional strength of East Asian states, is rooted in colonial history.<sup>28</sup> While Japanese colonialism in East Asia was characterised by extensive control of territory and populations, and intensive policies of social and economic transformation, European colonialism in Africa is best described as tentative.<sup>29</sup> 'Africa had little to offer as an outlet for European manufactures, and hardly more as a source of strategic raw materials.'<sup>30</sup> The Berlin Conference of 1884–85, at which colonial powers simply divided Africa among themselves on paper, provided the essential mechanism for claiming authority over a continent deemed worth having, but not worth fighting over or administering seriously. Recognising 'the high cost of administration and the low probability of reward', colonial powers would 'neither administrators nor conquerors' be.<sup>31</sup>

In place of such traditional modes of empirical state formation as conquest and control, the African state was constructed on European strategies of 'administration on the cheap', within juridical territories demarcated in Berlin. Emergent colonial states had no need to penetrate and

control sparsely populated rural areas in order to hold them, because borders were externally guaranteed. In establishing a minimal level of internal control, colonial administrators pursued similar strategies, consolidating their juridical states on the foundation of legal agreements with thousands of 'traditional rulers'.<sup>32</sup> African authorities which resisted this juridical usurpation overtly were removed or defeated militarily (generally through the use of African troops from neighbouring societies), and became object lessons to others. Soon enough, traditional rulers, from kings and emirs of large and relatively powerful polities, to village-level authorities of chieftaincies and 'stateless' societies found ways to accommodate the demands of distant colonial administrators, while defending as much of their own authority as they could. Given the modest ambitions of the colonial project, that residual authority was often substantial. Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (in northern Nigeria) at independence characterised colonial administration thus: 'They made no drastic changes, and what was done came into effect only after consultation. Everything went on more or less as it had done, for what could one Resident, an assistant and a few soldiers in Sokoto do to change so vast an area as Sokoto Emirate?'<sup>33</sup> Chinua Achebe's novel *Things Fall Apart* is often cited as illustration of how even superficial contact with Europeans, especially missionaries, undermined traditional systems of governance in stateless societies. Less often cited is his novel *Arrow of God*, which portrays with equal force the continuing inability of the colonial administration to penetrate those same communities. In short, the African state was, from the moment of its colonial birth, severely lacking in infrastructural power, and socially rootless.<sup>34</sup> This is not to minimise its brutality – in fact, it goes a long way towards explaining it.

At independence, the colonial state was taken over by Africans, intact. African elites pursued four state consolidation strategies during the early postcolonial period: juridical reconsolidation of the borders, reinsulation of the state from popular pressure, power concentration and projection, and construction of informal networks to bridge the chasm between the state and society. Let us begin with the first two, which sought, in essence, to shore up the colonial state apparatus. Postcolonial African states were all vulnerable to the kind of secessionist movements that nearly tore Congo apart at the moment of its independence in 1960. Therefore, the heads of state agreed in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to forestall this universal threat by cementing colonial borders. The borders established by the Berlin Conference in 1885 to keep competing European powers out were relegitimised through the OAU Charter in 1963 to keep potentially secessionist regions in.<sup>35</sup> However, in both cases the heavily juridical foundation of the borders constituted a *de facto* recognition that

African states could not, and would not, fully control their territories. The next step was to reduce popular pressure on weak state institutions. While the colonial state had always been unabashedly authoritarian, completely insulated from societal demands, the postcolonial state was designed (by departing colonial administrators) to be democratic. For their part, the rising African elite had been engaged in massive mobilisation campaigns as they pressed for independence during the 1950s. Thus, the floodgates were opened at a time of unprecedented mass political engagement, when expectations were high that independent African countries would soon 'catch up' economically with the industrialised world, and just as African elites took over alien institutions that were never designed to accommodate the popular will. It should come as no surprise that democratic regimes hastily grafted onto authoritarian colonial state apparatuses seldom survived for long. By the end of the 1960s, military coups and/or the establishment of one-party systems had substantially reduced popular participation almost everywhere.<sup>36</sup> Thus, African states weathered the transition to independence by reinforcing their colonial attributes.

Having thus reconsolidated their positions, those in control of African states did seek to build up an empirical presence in their societies both formally, by concentrating and projecting infrastructural power, and informally, by constructing personalised networks of reciprocity. Power projection required building up state capacity 'to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* or use resources in determined ways'.<sup>37</sup> However, strong societies, left largely intact by colonial state building strategies, proved quite effective at resisting the encroachment of very weak state institutions.<sup>38</sup> Various authors have demonstrated the failure of the postcolonial state to penetrate and regulate society, and to extract and appropriate resources.<sup>39</sup> The construction of informal personalised linkages proved more successful, and over time supplanted institutional state building strategies. Whether these networks are seen to be rooted in universal aspects of 'patrimonial administrative states',<sup>40</sup> 'the texture of the historicity of African societies',<sup>41</sup> or simple political pragmatism,<sup>42</sup> virtually all scholars agree that they have been the real locus of politics, and governance, in postcolonial Africa.<sup>43</sup>

Over time these networks have grown into a dense web of state-society linkages, which, like a spider's web, is delicate, yet flexible; complex, yet nearly invisible. At the most basic level, the individual strands of the web act as conduits, along which political support flows up, and material resources flow down. To maintain his strand of the web, each 'big man' must gain access to the pool of state resources; to maintain the web as a whole, the 'big men' must sustain the pool of state resources, by constantly resupplying it from the global economy. According to Bayart, 'the social



struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and the production of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and poor – participate in the world of networks'.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the formal institutional weakness of the African state constitutes only half of the story. The other half, which receives far less scholarly attention and virtually no attention in the global policy making community or the public discourse at large, is what happens in the absence of state institutions. '*Africa Works*', proclaims the title of a recent book by Chabal and Daloz.<sup>45</sup> *How* it works is fundamentally determined by the state having one foot firmly embedded in society, and the other equally firmly embedded in an international system increasingly driven by the institutions and processes of globalisation. The precise, historically specific nature of these moorings produces an historically specific 'African' state, and it is to these that we must turn.

#### THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF AFRICAN STATES

Regardless of whether the personalised networks that link state and society in Africa derive in the first instance from the interests of peasants, or those of politicians, they 'work' because they make sense in the overall social structural context of African societies, the defining characteristic of which remains peasant predominance.<sup>46</sup> Peasant societies have never produced centralised states. As localised self-sufficient production systems, they have no use for them, and do not generate sufficient economic surplus to sustain them. These same attributes also make them fairly impervious to penetration by externally created states. In his widely cited study of Tanzania, Hyden maintains that '[p]easants in Africa have largely succeeded in exercising their own power by denying the officials controlling the state the opportunity to establish effective relations of dependence'.<sup>47</sup> Such relations of dependence have elsewhere been established by landowning aristocracies, which then 'acted as a pivot and backbone in the process of State formation'.<sup>48</sup> Feudal lords emerged from autonomous processes of historical development in Europe and Asia, while in Latin America Iberian colonialism established powerful landowning classes that eventually became the 'pivot and backbone' of state formation processes there as well. Colonialism in Africa blocked indigenous processes that might have eventually produced such a class (as in Europe and Asia),<sup>49</sup> and failed to create a landowning class directly (as in Latin America).<sup>50</sup> As a result, land distribution in Africa today remains *relatively* egalitarian, and ownership largely communal. Chiefs or elders have some power to affect the distribution of usufruct rights, but they cannot deny access to land, and they cannot control production.<sup>51</sup> Colonialism in Africa thus created artificial 'states' without transforming the underlying social structure to

make them socially relevant. The absence of both a landlord class and a capable state makes the growth of an African bourgeoisie extremely difficult.<sup>52</sup> And so, lacking other social support bases, the postcolonial state has accommodated peasant society. Harrison has recently reaffirmed the necessity of conceptualising African politics in terms of the interaction between peasant majorities, which are far from passive, and postcolonial states, which are far from hegemonic.<sup>53</sup> Bayart's metaphorical description of the social embeddedness of the African state in peasant societies is quite elegant:

the postcolonial State operates as a rhizome rather than a root system. Although it is endowed with its own historicity, it is not one-dimensional, formed around a single genetic trunk, like a majestic oak tree whose roots spread deep into the soil of history. It is rather an infinitely variable multiplicity of networks whose underground branches join together the scattered points of society. In order to understand it, we must do more than examine the institutional buds above ground and look instead at its adventitious roots in order to analyze the bulbs and tubers from which it secretly extracts its nourishment and its vivacity.<sup>54</sup>

Although it is not integrated into the metaphor, Bayart explicitly recognises that this rhizome state, with its myriad underground networks, thrives only so long as it also has access to resources from the global economy. To return to the metaphor, the rhizome extracts nourishment from the soil of society, but it is equally dependent for its survival on the rain provided by the international system.<sup>55</sup>

#### THE GLOBAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF AFRICAN STATES

In a chapter provocatively entitled 'The Bounties of Dependence', Chabal and Daloz describe the global embeddedness of African states thus:

Although it is customary to think of those who are dependent as the victims of an unequal economic relationship on which they have little purchase, the realities of post-colonial Africa are rather different. As is perhaps best illustrated by the question of debt, African rulers have managed since independence to devise successful strategies for the transfer of funds to the states over which they preside. The debate about dependence is not whether such transfers were beneficial to the 'development' of African countries, as in most instances they obviously were not. Nor is it about whether donor countries did find ways of extracting from Africa far more than was ever given in the

first place, which they did. Our argument here is simply to stress that such transfers provided African states with a much higher level of financial resources than they would otherwise have possessed. Dependence was thus one of the chief instruments which enabled African elites to obtain the means to continue to feed the patrimonial systems on which their power rests.<sup>56</sup>

This is not a particularly well-kept secret. Killick, in a study of the ineffectiveness of aid in Africa, for example, notes that the absorptive capacity of African states is severely limited insofar as they are 'penetrated by personal relations operating to satisfy individual and communal aspirations and not as the guardian of the national interest', but suggests that 'bad governments that run down the economy are apt to be removed'.<sup>57</sup> This analysis fails to appreciate the extent to which the pursuit of communal aspirations rather than national interest is rooted not only in patrimonial states, but also in peasant societies. It is true, however, that patronage politics preempts productive public investment and should eventually undermine itself by depleting its own resource base. Killick's own data suggest why this was not happening: between 1980 and 1988 annual per capita foreign aid to non-African low and middle income countries averaged \$0.50, while annual per capita foreign aid to Africa was \$21.85.<sup>58</sup> In the first half of the 1990s, median real per capita aid to Africa rose to \$51.59.<sup>59</sup>

As a continent of independent countries, Africa was born into the Cold War. At that historical juncture, the most efficacious strategies for maximising foreign aid and minimising constraints on its use were fairly straightforward, and indeed quite effective. Superpowers bought allies, and paid scant attention to what happened to the purchase price. Loyalty being an amorphous thing, it had to be continually renegotiated, and repurchased. Under these conditions, foreign aid became a reliable resource stream, which ruling elites were able to use 'primarily as an additional source of clientelistic revenue'.<sup>60</sup> As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s, and structural adjustment programmes took aim at patrimonial practices, one might expect to find these systems breaking down, opening space for institutions to grow perhaps. On the contrary, argue Chabal and Daloz, 'structural adjustment has been "Africanized" – that is adapted to the realities of the patrimonial system' and as a result it 'has saved the patrimonial African state from complete economic ruin'.<sup>61</sup> Despite repeated and obvious failures to implement structural adjustment programmes, international financial institutions have been loath to turn off the foreign aid spigot – to stop the rain. Partly their own credibility is on the line; partly two decades of ineffective structural adjustment lending have generated such a huge debt overhang that they have become co-dependent, and partly they,

and their Western stakeholders, fear the violence and instability that would most likely follow a disruption in resource flows. Like structural adjustment programmes, international democratisation initiatives of the 1990s have been tamed, and absorbed by elites presiding over rhizome states. One begins to believe that African rainmakers are invincible. They are not.

Globalisation has revealed the Achilles' heel of African states: Africa is increasingly irrelevant to the rest of the world. The vast majority of sub-Saharan African countries fall into the IMF/World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) category, which, with their 'high levels of poverty, limited domestic resources, and weak state capabilities', constitute 'a semi-permanent group of states on the margins of the globalizing world economy'.<sup>62</sup> Africa accounts for a miniscule and declining share of world trade; labour costs are high and productivity low compared with Southeast Asia; economies are not responding to structural adjustment programmes and states are not responding adequately to democratisation or institution building programmes (for the reasons discussed above). Having grown steadily throughout the Cold War period, net foreign aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa peaked in 1990, and after holding steady for a few years, began to decline precipitously.<sup>63</sup> In per capita terms, development aid to Africa has dropped 40 per cent in the last decade.<sup>64</sup> The rainmakers are failing, and the rhizomes are drying out and becoming brittle. As states lose access to international resources, patronage networks decline, and peasant societies withdraw. Cut loose from their dual moorings, beacons of stability and hope, like Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire, are going dark, as previously more internationally dependent states, like Liberia and Somalia, collapse entirely.

But hold. Does rising violence and instability suggest a kind of negative imperative for the globalising world to engage Africa? The genocide in Rwanda produced 800,000 dead within three months; the international war in Congo 2.2 million in a few years; warlords rule the day in Somalia and Liberia, and may well return in Sierra Leone when the United Nations and British missions withdraw. Nevertheless, the United States and France, the major players in Africa, continue to withdraw. The United States ignored the Rwandan genocide, and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's pleas for help in Sierra Leone. France is pulling back from its commitments to keep 'friends' in power.<sup>65</sup> In short, international patrons have found that in the era of globalisation they cannot easily affect stability in Africa, and that the fallout from instability and violence does not have much of an impact on the rest of the global community.<sup>66</sup> As the hold of the state slips away, arms proliferation and international drug trafficking grow, as does the HIV/AIDS pandemic. And, finally, there is the potential for international terrorist activity. Unlike violence in Rwanda or Congo, these threats have the potential to reach beyond the African continent. The 2002

US National Security Strategy identifies failed states as breeding grounds for international terrorism, and thus a threat to US national security, and promises a 50 per cent increase in US foreign assistance. This could provide an opportunity for reinvigorating patrimonial states in Africa, or even for constructing a new kind of state, since the national security strategy includes an explicit commitment to see aid resources used for the purposes they are intended. With a failed state and a local organisation, al Ittihad, linked to al Qaeda, Somalia has received significant counter-terrorism attention. However, the strategy of choice has been containment: surveillance flights, coastal patrols and information sharing with neighbouring Ethiopia, which has a history of successful military operations against al Ittihad (because of its association with the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia) and has offered to act as a proxy army.<sup>67</sup> The US may find that the border between Africa and the rest of the world is sufficiently impenetrable to avoid serious engagement, even in the context of its 'global war on terrorism'.<sup>68</sup>

#### THE EXCEPTIONS THAT PROVE THE RULE?

If the HIPC majority seems likely to remain confined to the margins of the globalising world, what of the more fortunate minority? The non-HIPC countries fall very clearly into two categories: oil exporters (Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria) and South Africa and its immediate neighbours (South Africa, plus Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe).<sup>69</sup> Clearly, no oil exporting country can be considered marginal in the globalising world, and oil revenues certainly provide resources of maintaining patronage networks. However, in Africa, transnational oil and mining companies, operating in isolated mineral enclaves and mostly off-shore oil installations, increasingly contract for their own private security, and do not need generalised stability, or even a state, to be profitable. At the same time, the ability of African elites to access revenues directly from their transnational partners reduces their incentive to patronise. Reno suggests that globalisation is indeed altering the incentive structures of African elites in mineral exporting countries. 'This shift, the commercialization of political struggle and jettisoning of obligations to citizens and former clients, lies at the heart of the warlord politics that follows patronage politics'.<sup>70</sup> To the extent that this is true, this subset of African countries may join the HIPC majority on the margins of the globalising world, even as their natural resources continue to flow into its centre.

South Africa and its neighbours are better positioned. As South African labour reserves, the economic fate of Lesotho and Swaziland has always been, and will continue to be, largely dependent upon South Africa. This

leaves four countries that clearly do stand apart from the rest of Africa. In three of these (South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe) colonialism was far more intrusive than elsewhere in Africa. To varying degrees, it dispossessed peasant producers and created (white) agrarian landowning classes.<sup>71</sup> On the foundation of this transformation, colonial states were embedded in rural class structures more similar to South America than to the rest of Africa.<sup>72</sup> South Africa was independent from 1910, Namibia was essentially a colony of South Africa from 1915, and Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) 'was nearly a self-governing dominion' from 1923.<sup>73</sup> Thus, in all three cases, the state was constructed upon the existing constellation of local interests, and as a result implemented economic policies that centred on maximising growth and development in the territory (without adversely impacting on agriculture), rather than maximising resource extraction for a metropole. In the South African case, agricultural interests had to be carefully balanced against those of foreign capital, which dominated the mining industry at the beginning of the twentieth century. This marriage of gold and maize eventually gave birth to a diversified industrial economy and, through the affinity of capitalism and bureaucracy, a relatively strong bureaucratic state. In short, these 'exceptions' tend to support the argument that the impact of globalisation on economic performance is mediated through state and class structures, which are in turn products of colonial history.

Botswana affirms this conclusion in a slightly different way. At independence in 1966, Botswana was led by a small, cohesive (biracial) class of large cattle owners.<sup>74</sup> Thus, although Botswana did not display the familiar southern African pattern of concentrated land ownership, it was nevertheless characterised by an agrarian elite, in which the postcolonial state was clearly anchored.<sup>75</sup> The administrative apparatus of the state was largely expatriate in composition, and insulated from both social and political interests. The regional context provided the glue that cemented an intrastate relationship in which the politicians would reign, while the bureaucrats ruled – much as in East Asia. Botswana was small and weak in 1966 – its population was well under one million, it was extremely poor, and it was a South African labour reserve. It had two large and powerful (racist) neighbours actively threatening its territorial integrity, and it had no armed forces. In this environment, elites opted for stability and efficiency because their survival depended upon it. The interests of the cattle sector would drive economic policy, but not at the expense of overall economic performance. With the entry of De Beers, Botswana's 'triple alliance' was in place. The bureaucratic capacity of the state was crucial in negotiating De Beers' entry, and in effectively managing the diamond rents that poured into the country over the following two decades. The marriage of diamonds and cattle, presided over by a capable state, has not given birth to an industrial economy, but it has preserved Botswana's exceptionality.<sup>76</sup>

# MARGINALISATION, GLOBALISATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION

Most of Africa is on the brink. Some say the brink of disaster, others the brink of rebirth, still others the brink of a postmodern warlordism that falls somewhere in between. All agree that globalisation will play a key role in determining the parameters of the coming transformation. Kaplan argues that West Africa is the leading edge of global processes by which resource scarcity is leading to environmental degradation, which is leading in turn to conflict and the breakdown of state and social institutions, and even international borders.<sup>77</sup> Although he maintains that the border between Africa and the rest of the world is becoming increasingly impenetrable, Kaplan still believes that 'we ignore this dying region at our own risk'.<sup>78</sup> Ake agrees that 'Africa is so marginal now that it is difficult for non-Africans to bring themselves to care about what happens in the continent ... particularly when it entails some cost'. But he sees the silver lining in Kaplan's black cloud. 'Perhaps', Ake suggests, 'marginalization, so often decried, is what Africa needs right now.'

For one thing, it will help with the evolution of an endogenous development agenda, an agenda that expresses the aspirations of the people and can therefore elicit their support ... [W]hat Africa has [now] is a confusion of agendas, reflecting the demonstrated failure of an exogenous agenda that its promoters do not acknowledge and the unfulfilled promise of an endogenous agenda that African leaders are too dependent and too diffident to push through. The marginalization of Africa in the world economy could be useful in another important sense. Insofar as it leaves the development of Africa to Africans, it offers a chance of breaking out of another major development trap – the dissociation of development strategy from social experience.<sup>79</sup>

Where Kaplan is blinded by the social disintegration evident in the slums of African cities, Ake has faith in the dense fabric of largely rural African societies. Each sees Africa heading 'back to the future'. Kaplan sees West Africa reverting to 'a series of coastal trading posts, such as Freetown and Conakry, and an interior that, owing to violence, volatility, and disease, is again becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, "blank" and "unexplored"'.<sup>80</sup> Ake sees a return to the sovereign authority and good governance that was quietly practised in the 'blank and unexplored' areas of Victorian maps of Africa. Where Kaplan foresees violent statelessness, Ake foresees an opportunity for developing legitimate states based on grassroots democracy. Where Kaplan fears disaster, Ake dares to hope for rebirth.

The disaster and rebirth scenarios both assume that marginalisation is leading to an almost complete de-linking of Africa from the globalising world, and thus envision state transformations that are independent of the international system. In contrast, Reno argues that the end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalisation generated 'a sudden shift in the calculus of opportunity' facing African rulers, and their rivals. Globalisation brings both challenges (declining public resource flows) and opportunities (availability of new private partners). This scenario also sees Africa heading 'back to the future'.

Regime efforts to control resources recall some compromises made by colonial states, which were forced to choose between *Afrique utile* (areas that produced revenues sufficient to pay for administration) and *Afrique inutile* (areas abandoned by the state as too costly to administer). Whereas the contemporary version of *Afrique utile* is delineated in terms of controlling saleable resources rather than of colonial concerns with labor, its *inutile* counterpart still denotes regions and people that are best governed lightly, if at all, rather than waste scarce revenues in attempts to control them. So, too, rulers may now prefer an "integral state" of strong bureaucracies and an autonomous purpose of development. But if they are unable to redirect society to this task, rulers use ties to creditors, foreign firms, and clandestine trading networks to control resources and build political authority.<sup>81</sup>

Sub-Saharan Africa is a large and diverse region, and it seems likely that all three of these scenarios will be evident in twenty-first century political experimentations. Tilly reminds us that national states coexisted and competed with many other forms of political organisation in Europe before finally emerging as the model for Europe, and indeed the world.<sup>82</sup> Africa may well be entering a similar stage of political experimentation, as the external and internal pillars of the postcolonial state continue to erode. Globalisation will surely be an element in this political experimentation, providing exploitable external opportunities to some and denying them to others.

Globalisation has already played a role in the erosion of the foundation the postcolonial African state. But this erosion is unrelated to usual criticisms of globalisation. In other parts of the developing world the pressure to adopt efficiency maximising trade policies based on comparative advantage undermines the ability of the state to pursue independent development strategies. In Africa the effect is of an altogether different sort. Regardless of the international trade regime, Africa's rhizome states cannot act as developmental states. They are essentially rentier states,



delivering small amounts of resources to fragmented societies through informal personalised networks. As long as they have access to external resources, they can hold themselves and their societies together. But they cannot act as agents of national development on the model of developmental states. Developmental states gather resources from society for productive investment in national development. They are 'oak trees' rooted in predominantly capitalist class structures. It may be that rhizomes rooted in predominantly pre-capitalist class structures can oversee some form of development. But in that endeavour, Africans will find no model from which to draw lessons. They will have to start from scratch, from their own limited resources and their own heretofore under-tapped creativity, and generate a new model. Fantu Cheru has recently drawn 'roadmaps to the challenge of globalization', charting an alternative path for Africa.<sup>83</sup> However, African elites are unlikely to embrace such a departure as long as they can stay on the path of least resistance, feeding their patrimonial networks with international resources. But, alas, the globalising world continues to pull further ahead and apart from Africa, and this path is becoming ever steeper.

## NOTES

The author would like to thank Donald Rothchild and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.

1. Saleh M. Nsouli and Françoise Le Gall, 'Globalization and Africa', *Finance and Development*, 38/4 (2001), 1 (online version), paraphrasing remarks of Anne Krueger, the IMF's First Deputy Managing Director. See also G.E. Gondwe, 'Making Globalization Work in Africa', *Finance and Development*, 38/4 (2001), 1 (online version).
2. 'IMF Builds on Initiatives to Meet Challenges of Globalization', *IMF Survey*, 26 Sept. 1997, 1.
3. Kidane Mengisteab, *Globalization and Autocentricity in Africa's Development in the 21st Century* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996), 17. A similar observation was made a decade earlier by Ralph Austin – in reference to the precolonial period. See *African Economic History* (London: James Currey, 1987), 102. See also Thomas Callaghy, 'Africa and the World Economy: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place', in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 39–68, and Thomas Callaghy, 'Africa and the World Political Economy: Still Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place', in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 41–68.
4. This discussion is limited to sub-Saharan Africa, which will be referred to as 'Africa' hereafter.
5. United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Handbook of Statistics on-line*.
6. Ismail Serageldin, *Development Partners* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency, 1993), 95, cited in Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 113, and World Bank, *World*

*Development Report* 2001. Ajayi reports slightly higher figures, which, however, indicate a greater decline over time. According to him, Africa's share of world exports was 5.3% in the 1960–69 period and 2.4% in the 1990–98 period, imports 5.0% and 2.2%, respectively. Ajayi, 'What Africa Needs', 2.

7. World Bank, *World Development Report* 1991 and 2001.
8. The classic statement of this position is, of course, Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1967). Its African counterpart is Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982).
9. All data in this section are from the World Bank *World Development Reports* for 1991 and 2000/2001.
10. World Bank, *World Development Report* 1997.
11. Ajayi, 'What Africa Needs', 1; Evangelos A. Calamitsis, 'The Need for Stronger Domestic Policies and International Support', *Finance and Development*, 38/4 (2001), 2–3 (online version); Seyni N'Diaye, 'The Role of Institutional Reforms', *Finance and Development*, 38/4 (2001), 1–2 (online version); Robert Sharer, 'An Agenda for Trade, Investment, and Regional Integration', *Finance and Development*, 38/4 (2001), 2 (online version); World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20–34.
12. World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1989), 192; World Bank, *Adjustment in Africa*, 34.
13. World Bank, *World Development Report* 1997; World Bank, *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance* (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000), 73–8.
14. See, for example, *Reforming Public Institutions*.
15. See the World Bank's *World Development Report* 2002, entitled *Building Institutions for Markets*.
16. See Fantu Cheru, *African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization* (NY: Zed Books, 2002), *Africa Recovery*, 12/2 (Nov. 1998), 25 (box within article on Tokyo Conference); Thandika Mkandawire and Charles C. Soludo, *Our Continent Our Future* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1999); Mengisteab, *Globalization and Autocentricity*; Sanjaya Lall, 'Opening Up – and Shutting Down? Synthesis, Policies and Conclusions', in Sanjaya Lall (ed.), *The Technological Response to Import Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (NY: St. Martins Press, 1999), 271; and Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 43–50, among many others. Mengisteab makes a compelling argument for the need to integrate the massive peasant sector into development strategies in Africa, which would also require substantially stronger state institutions.
17. Julius O. Ihonvbere, 'Avoiding Globalization: The State and Depoliticization in Nigeria', in Francis Adams, Satya Gupta and Kidane Mengisteab (eds.), *Globalization and the Dilemmas of the State in the South* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 163.
18. Mkandawire and Soludo, *Our Continent*, 133.
19. World Bank, *Reforming Public Institutions*, 74–5; World Bank, *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: Implementation Update*, Part 2 (April 2002), 1, 76.
20. Peter Evans, 'Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists', in Frederic Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 203–26; Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). The 'developmental state' literature does not offer much insight into institutional capacity building processes. Indeed, the bulk of the debate has centred comparative analysis of the role of (relatively capable) states in the NICs of East Asia and South America, with scant, if any, attention to non-industrialising countries with weak states. (See, for example, Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1989); Frederic Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian*

- Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Peter B. Evans, *Dependent Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Gary Gereffi, 'Rethinking Development Theory: Insights from East Asia and Latin America', *Sociological Forum* 4 (1989), 505–33; Thomas B. Gold, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharp, 1986); Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon (eds.), *Pacific Dynamics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Ziya Onis, 'The Logic of the Developmental State', *Comparative Politics*, 23 (1991), 109–26; Robert Wade, *Governing the Market* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gordon White, *Developmental States in East Asia* (NY: St. Martins, 1989). Those analyses that have attempted to situate the NIC experience in a broader context, point to a causal relationship between state capacity and economic development, but still without offering insights into how weak states might learn from the state building experiences of the NICs. (See Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Letitia Lawson, 'Social Origins of Development and Underdevelopment' (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Davis, 1995); Erich Weede, 'Political Democracy, State Strength, and Economic Growth in LDCs', *Review of International Studies*, 10 (1984), 297–312.)
21. Evans, 'Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia'. For further development of these themes, see Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
  22. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*, 43–7, 85, 248.
  23. Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1962), 418, cited in Thomas Callaghy, *The State–Society Struggle* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1984), 12.
  24. Aristide Zolberg, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa', *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1968), 70.
  25. Callaghy, *State–Society Struggle*, 32.
  26. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', *World Politics* 35 (1982), 22. Post Cold-War history suggests that Migdal was right to highlight the role of the bipolar configuration of the international system in this process of keeping very weak states afloat. When the Berlin wall collapsed, African states felt the ground shifting beneath them. See Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 23.
  27. Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 251.
  28. Herbst, *States and Power*, 58–96, provides an excellent synthesis of a large literature.
  29. For a brief discussion of Japanese colonialism in East Asia and its effects on the postcolonial state and economic development, see Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery*, 35, 52, 78–9, and 194–5.
  30. Philip Curtin *et al.*, *African History* (NY: Longman, 1995), 405.
  31. Herbst, *States and Power*, 71, 67. Crawford Young argues that the colonial project in Africa was taken much more seriously than Herbst suggests, and as result he portrays the colonial state as substantially stronger. For a succinct discussion, see Crawford Young, 'The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy', in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), *The Precarious Balance* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 25–66.
  32. Although much is made of the theoretical differences between British 'indirect' and French 'direct' rule in Africa, most scholars agree with Coquery-Vidrovitch that 'all the colonialists, of whatever nationality, desired effective collaboration with the local chiefs'. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 90.
  33. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, *My Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 19, cited in Herbst, *States and Power*, 84.

34. Herbst, *States and Power*, provides a spatial explanation of the weakness of both the colonial and postcolonial state. For a contrasting view, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton University Press, 1996). Mamdani argues that the decentralised despotic state constructed under colonialism continues to control rural society quite effectively.
35. As written in 1963, the Charter (article III, para. 3) established 'Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence'. A 1964 resolution on border problems was more specific, pledging member states 'to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence'. Herbst, *States and Power*, 104. See also Jackson and Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist', and Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, who stress the role of the United Nations in the recognition of states, in addition to that of regional organisations.
36. Only Botswana and Mauritius have maintained democratic regimes throughout the postcolonial period.
37. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 4. Forrest disaggregates capacity into structural autonomy, penetration of society, extraction of resources, and ideological legitimisation. Joshua B. Forrest, 'The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa', *Comparative Politics*, 14 (1988), 423–42. Autonomy and legitimisation are addressed below, from a slightly different perspective.
38. While Migdal's juxtaposition of strong societies and weak states is very useful, I am not persuaded by his argument that colonialism and capitalism laid the foundation for strong societies and weak states, at least not in Africa. Both colonialism and capitalism had far more superficial effects in Africa than Migdal suggests. He argues that colonial policies '(1) effecting important changes in *land tenure* patterns; (2) adopting new forms and procedures of *taxation*; and (3) instituting new modes of *transportation*' undermined existing forms of social control in the Third World (*Strong Societies and Weak States*, 56). He notes correctly that sub-Saharan Africa largely escaped changes in land tenure arrangements, but nevertheless places Africa in the same category as other Third World countries. Herbst demonstrates that colonial taxation and transportation policies were also very thin in Africa (*States and Power*, 84–7, 116–17). Pre-colonial societies remain especially strong in Africa precisely because they were never systematically disrupted by colonialism or capitalism.
39. Herbst is a good (Weberian) state-centric example, while Hyden makes an equally compelling case from a (Marxian) society-centric perspective. See Herbst, *States and Power*, and Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa*.
40. Callaghy, *State–Society Struggle*, 60–62.
41. Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa* (NY: Longman, 1993), 208, 216. From a similar analytical perspective, Chabal and Daloz make an even stronger argument for rooting these networks of 'asymmetrical reciprocity' in African social structures. See Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).
42. Donald Rothchild, 'Hegemonial Exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa', in Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen (eds.), *Ethnicity, Politics, and Development* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1984), 65–104.
43. Even Jackson and Rosberg, who emphasise the importance of juridical attributes in 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist', recognise the centrality of such networks internally. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982).
44. Bayart, *The State in Africa*, 235.
45. Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*.
46. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa*, 9.
47. *Ibid.*, 32.
48. Bayart, *The State in Africa*, 108.
49. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden* (NY: Times Books, 1992), 59–76, suggests that

some pre-colonial kingdoms were on the verge of transformation in the mid-nineteenth century (citing the example of Asante, clearly the most developed in this regard); Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Africa*, suggests that a well developed West African 'slave mode of production' was disrupted by colonial emancipation laws in the late nineteenth century.

50. Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Africa*, 115–16; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 215–16.
51. Former settler colonies – Zimbabwe and to a less extent Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire – have colonially created land owning classes, and are partial exceptions to this generalisation. South Africa is clearly the exception that proves the rule. There the peasant mode of production was systematically destroyed, and the land owning class that was created became the backbone of state formation processes, following the global model. (South Africa is, in this sense, more similar to South America than to other African societies.) The current land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe may effectively undermine this class, thus, ironically, weakening the position of the state vis-à-vis society.
52. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944) provides a classic analysis of the dynamic relationships among landed classes, the state, and the bourgeoisie in England. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979) provide an equally influential and compelling analysis of the Latin American context, which integrates, without overemphasising, international factors.
53. Graham Harrison, *Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 23–48.
54. Bayart, *The State in Africa*, 220–21.
55. *Ibid.*, 21–7.
56. Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 114–15.
57. Anthony Killick, 'The Developmental Effectiveness of Aid to Africa', in Ishrat Husain and John Underwood (eds.), *African External Finance in the 1990s* (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1991), 92. For a more recent example of precisely the same disconnect, see Carol Lancaster, *Aid to Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 27–30. Both authors also argue that aid agencies themselves have been part of the problem of aid ineffectiveness in Africa.
58. Killick, 'The Developmental Effectiveness', 87.
59. Carol Lancaster and Samuel Wangwe, *Managing a Smooth Transition from Aid Dependence in Africa* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 2000), 13.
60. Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, 116.
61. *Ibid.*, 119–23. Quotes are on pp.123 and 121 respectively.
62. Thomas Callaghy, 'Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt Regime', in Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (eds.), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 118–120.
63. I am referring here to net aid flows in constant dollars. In current dollars, the peak was in 1994. Lancaster, *Aid to Africa*, 70.
64. World Bank, *Issue Briefs: Africa*, April 2002 (downloaded from [www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/pbafr.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/pbafr.htm), 18 Sept. 2002).
65. French forces have been significantly involved in containing the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, but have been careful to avoid becoming directly involved in its resolution, deferring instead to ECOWAS (as of the end of June 2003). British forces have also been critical in maintaining order in Sierra Leone in 2002, in the midst of the UN intervention there. Most recently, France led a multinational peacemaking force, which deployed to the town of Bunia (Democratic Republic of the Congo) in June 2003 to disrupt conflict that appeared to be taking on genocidal patterns in the wake of the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the area.
66. In the face of this international withdrawal, African elites are pragmatically constructing new security arrangements amongst themselves. President Patasse of the Central African

Republic, previously dependent upon French military protection (from his own army), traded mineral rights for security with Libya, and later relied upon Congolese rebel forces for security, before finally succumbing to a military coup in March 2003. Presidents Kabila, father and son, traded mineral rights for security with Zimbabwe. Angola provided timely military reinforcements, which solidified the positions of very weak presidents in both the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo. In exchange it was given free reign to conduct operations against its Angolan rebel forces operating in the border regions of those countries.

67. Emily Clark, 'Somalia: A Litmus Test for U.S. Terrorism Policy', Center for Defense Information, 22 Feb. 2002 ([www.cdi.org/terrorism/somalia.cfm](http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/somalia.cfm)). See also 'Horn of Africa: "Stage Set for Success" in Counter-Terrorism, US Says', *IRIN News*, 13 Jan. 2003, and 'Horn of Africa: Press conference by US Major General John Sattler', *IRIN News* 21 Feb. 2003.
68. Although it has established an anti-terrorist task force in Djibouti, known as the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF), operations are focused across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, not in Africa.
69. This list excludes small island countries, one of which, Mauritius, is widely cited as an African economic success story. While it clearly is that, its size and other unique characteristics limit its comparability to mainland countries.
70. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 35.
71. The South African land law of 1913 confined peasants to 7% of the land area. This allocation was doubled in the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. (Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 143.) According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's 1970 *World Census of Agriculture*, more than 95% of South African farmland was held in large farms (defined as 50 or more hectares). Only Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay had similar levels of land concentration (Lawson, 'Social Origins of Development', 43, 65). Just before independence in 1980, 85% of Zimbabwe's arable land was held in 6,682 white-owned commercial farms (with more than half taxable income being generated by just 271 of them). (Seidman and Gagne, 'State, Law and Development in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 5 (1980), 168, cited in Pierre du Toit, *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 110.) At independence in 1990, in Namibia 57% of arable land was held in commercial farmlands, comprised of 6,292 farms belonging to 6,123 white owners and 181 black owners. (H. Geingob, Prime Minister's Address, National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question, Consensus Document, July 1991, Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister, 4–5, 12, cited in S.L. Harring, 'Inconsistencies in the Constitution of Namibia Regarding the Land Question', in F.M. d'Engelbronner-Kolff, M.O. Hinz and J.L. Sindano (eds.), *Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1998), 180.)
72. Of the African countries that were independent at the time, the FAO's 1970 *World Census of Agriculture* reports no large farms in all but two. Côte d'Ivoire had less than 5% and Kenya around 40%. Not surprisingly, these two countries experienced better than average economic performance in the 1965–80 period, both in terms of steady growth and structural diversification. I would argue that this was a direct result of the anchoring of the political class in productive economic class structures. However, the agrarian elite remained concentrated in particular regions of the countries, and the development coalition did not survive the passing of independence leaders in either country. Kenya experienced a slow economic descent after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, while Côte d'Ivoire experience a rapid decline following the death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993.
73. Du Toit, *State Building and Democracy*, 82.
74. The following discussion of Botswana draws heavily upon Abdi Ismail Samatar, *An*

*African Miracle* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999); Du Toit, *State Building and Democracy*; and Stephen John Stedman (ed.), *Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), although the analysis is substantially different from all of these.

75. For an early discussion of the critical importance of such an elite, see Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). Since independence, the cattle owning class has moved to solidify formal property rights as well.
76. For a discussion of the difficulties Botswana has had in moving into manufacturing, see Kenneth Good and Skye Hughes, 'Globalization and Diversification', *African Affairs*, 101 (2002), 39–59.
77. Robert Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Feb. 1994.
78. Ibid.
79. Ake, *Democracy and Development*, 118.
80. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy'.
81. Reno, *Warlord Politics*, 35.
82. Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
83. Cheru, *African Renaissance*. This is only the latest in a long line of 'alternative frameworks' offered by African intellectuals, which can be traced back to *The Lagos Plan of Action* of 1980.